Removing a Splinter by Amputating the Limb: How the SEC Misses the Mark (Again) on Executive Compensation with the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule by Gage, Carter D.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 63 
Number 1 Law, Technology, and the 
Organization of Work (Fall 2018) 
Article 10 
2018 
Removing a Splinter by Amputating the Limb: How the SEC 
Misses the Mark (Again) on Executive Compensation with the Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rule 
Carter D. Gage 
carter.gage@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carter D. Gage, Removing a Splinter by Amputating the Limb: How the SEC Misses the Mark (Again) on 
Executive Compensation with the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule, 63 St. Louis U. L.J. (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol63/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, 
please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
161 
REMOVING A SPLINTER BY AMPUTATING THE LIMB: HOW THE 
SEC MISSES THE MARK (AGAIN) ON EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION WITH THE PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the typical Walmart employee made less in the entire year than 
Michael Duke, Walmart’s then-chief executive officer (“CEO”), made on 
January 1st alone.1 In fact, Duke earned more than the typical Walmart 
employee’s yearly salary by lunchtime.2 The Economic Policy Institute (“EPI”) 
conducts a study each year determining how much the average CEO makes 
compared to the typical employee.3 In 2000, the ratio of CEO compensation-to-
median employee pay reached an all-time high of 376-to-1.4 In other words, the 
average CEO earned as much in one day as the typical employee of their 
company earned in 376 days. In 2016, that ratio dropped to a mere 271-to-1, 
which is a definite improvement.5 However, when the ratio in the United States 
is nearly twice as large as those in Switzerland and Germany, and Japanese 
CEOs make roughly fifty-eight times what their employees make, 271-to-1 
looks very bad.6  
The annual compensation, or “overcompensation” as some would call it, of 
American CEOs is not going unnoticed by the American public. A study from 
Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business in 2016 found that seventy-
four percent of Americans believe that CEOs are being paid more than they 
should in relation to their average employee’s salary.7 Leading up to the 2016 
 
 1. Philip Bump, The CEO of Your Company has Probably Already Earned Your 2016 Salary 
this Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016 
/01/05/the-ceo-of-your-company-has-probably-already-earned-your-2016-salary-this-year/?utm_ 
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 2. Id. 
 3. Lawrence Mishel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Pay Remains High Relative to the Pay of 
Typical Workers and High-Wage Earners, ECON. POLICY INST. (July 20, 2017), http://www.epi.org 
/publication/ceo-pay-remains-high-relative-to-the-pay-of-typical-workers-and-high-wage-earners/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VMF-3UC2]. 
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 5. Id. 
 6. Anders Melin, Executive Pay, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2018, 11:12 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/executive-pay [https://perma.cc/R9UG-GRNT]. 
 7. DAVID F. LARCKER, NICHOLAS DONATIELLO & BRIAN TAYAN, STANFORD GRADUATE 
SCH. OF BUS., AMERICANS AND CEO PAY: 2016 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY ON CEO 
COMPENSATION 3 (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-sur 
vey-2016-americans-ceo-pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSY7-Q3HC]. 
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Presidential election, candidates from both sides of the aisle addressed the issue, 
and then-candidate Donald Trump called the current executive compensation 
environment “a total and complete joke.”8 However, the massive inequality 
between executive pay and typical employee pay has not always been an element 
of the American business landscape. In the thirty years between 1985 and 2015, 
the CEO-to-typical employee pay ratio increased from 46-to-1 to 276-to-1.9 
American lawmakers have explored numerous avenues attempting to curb this 
executive compensation issue. The latest iteration comes in the form of a 
mandatory disclosure required by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) and Item 402 of 
Regulation S-K.10 Under the “SEC Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule,” which came into 
effect for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2017, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires public companies to disclose the ratio 
of the compensation of their CEOs to the median compensation of their 
employees in their yearly proxy statement.11 
Due to this Rule’s likely inefficacy and the unreasonable burden it will put 
on reporting companies caused by inexactitude and a lack of direction from the 
SEC, the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule will likely cause more harm than good.12 If 
the American government truly wants to rein in executive compensation, it 
should look to two separate sources for a blueprint to success: the German 
government and American history books. A combination of executive and board 
regulations inspired by the German government and employee-centric social 
influences that had success in America’s past could curb executive 
compensation and allow for both employees and shareholders to offer their input 
in more efficient and effective fashions. 
Part I of this article will address the historical context behind executive 
compensation in the United States and why it has become such a topic for 
concern. In addition, Part I will discuss how American society has approached 
the issue of executive compensation, both in the courts and in boardrooms. Part 
II will discuss the three avenues American government has previously taken to 
 
 8. Jacob Goldstein, Why Did America’s CEOs Get Such a Big Raise?, NPR PLANET MONEY 
(Feb. 18, 2016, 4:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/18/467253394/why-did-americas-ceos-get 
-such-a-big-raise [https://perma.cc/L829-RXY5]. 
 9. Roger Lowenstein, CEO Pay Is Out of Control. Here’s How to Rein It In, FORTUNE (Apr. 
19, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/19/executive-compensation-ceo-pay/ [https://perma.cc/9PH 
6-25FW]. 
 10. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure 
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [https://perma.cc/TDB3-Z 
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 11. Id. 
 12. IKE BRANNON, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, THE EGREGIOUS COSTS OF 
THE SEC’S PAY-RATIO DISCLOSURE REGULATION 2 (2014), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Egregious-Cost-of-Pay-Ratio-5.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W44-
6BH2]. 
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address executive compensation: taxation, “say-on-pay” proposals, and 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Part III of this article will discuss the 
government’s latest attempt at curbing executive compensation: the SEC Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rule. This section will discuss the requirements of the rule 
itself, the public reaction to the rule, the application of the rule, and its likely 
results. Part IV of this article will discuss how the German government has 
handled the issue of executive compensation and will suggest that the American 
government, drawing inspiration from its German counterpart, implement 
employee representation on compensation committees through non-binding 
recommendations.  
II.  A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE (OVER)COMPENSATION 
A historical overview of executive compensation begins with the rise of the 
position to be compensated: the executive. In general, the position of 
“executive” exists simply as a medium through which passive owner-
shareholders manage large corporations.13 Until the turn of the twentieth 
century, executives did not exist, for the most part, because there was no need 
for them.14 Organizations were run by individuals who received their 
compensation mostly from direct ownership.15 The rise of salaried middle 
managers began with railroads, which were too expansive and complex as 
companies to be run by individuals.16 Then, the “Great Merger Movement” of 
the early twentieth century led to dispersed ownership as smaller companies 
came together to form industrial conglomerates.17 As companies grew in size, 
majority owners handed off their senior management positions to non-owner 
executives tasked with running the company in a way that would satisfy 
shareholders.18 
During the era leading up to World War I, executives were compensated no 
differently than other employees.19 The predecessor to executive compensation 
came in the form of executive bonus plans, and one of the first executive bonus 
plans arose at Bethlehem Steel, headed at the time by Charles Schwab.20 Under 
that bonus plan, executives were paid a share of the company’s net profits, and 
these bonuses grew nearly to the level of shareholder dividends by the late 
1920s.21 Executive bonus plans became increasingly popular as a method to 
 
 13. Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight Over Executive 
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 695 (2010). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 696. 
 18. Wells, supra note 13, at 696. 
 19. Id. at 697. 
 20. Id. at 699. 
 21. Id. 
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align executive incentives with those of the shareholders.22 Owners reaped the 
benefits of increased shareholder value and, consequently, rewarded executives 
with bonuses to incentivize the growth of company profits.23 
The first widely-heard objections to executive compensation policies 
coincided with the fall of the American economy during the Great Depression. 
With the economy failing, the American public became fixated on the idea that 
corporations awarding executive compensation exceeding $1,000,000, like the 
salaries brought home by the top executives at Bethlehem Steel, American 
Tobacco, and National City Bank at the end of the 1920s, should have been 
contributing some of that compensation to lower employees in hopes of 
stimulating the economy.24 However, public outrage against executive 
compensation was not merely a coincidental byproduct of a failing economy. 
The public may have spoken out about these executive salaries before the fall of 
their economy, but they did not understand to what extent executives were being 
compensated. In fact, the amounts paid to executives as compensation were, for 
the most part, unknown to those in the public sphere until they were released to 
the public as a result of lawsuits that were often unrelated to compensation.25  
Although public disclosure of executive salaries is commonplace today, the 
first compelled compensation disclosures did not come until the 1930s.26 New 
Deal-era politicians, with the help of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
implemented the country’s first pay disclosure requirements,27 the first of which 
required railroads to identify those executives whose compensation exceeded 
$10,000 a year.28 In 1934, the SEC was created pursuant to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.29 Later that year, the SEC released rules requiring that 
publicly owned companies release the compensation, including the various 
components, of their top three executives.30 
While executive compensation continued to rise relative to inflation through 
the 1930s, the 1940s brought a drop in executive compensation that has not been 
 
 22. Id. at 701. 
 23. Wells, supra note 13, at 701. 
 24. Steven A. Bank, Brian R. Cheffins & Harwell Wells, Executive Pay: What Worked?, 42 
J. CORP. L. 59, 64 (2016). 
 25. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How We Got There, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECON. OF FIN. 44 (George Constantinides et al. eds., Elsevier/North-Holland, 
2013). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.; Railroad Salary Report: I.C.C. Asks Class 1 Roads About Jobs Paying More Than 
$10,000 a Year, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1932, at 2. 
 29. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9KF-BXEW] (last visited Nov. 12, 
2018). 
 30. Murphy, supra note 25, at 45. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] REMOVING A SPLINTER BY AMPUTATING THE LIMB 165 
seen in the years since.31 With World War II tightening labor markets and 
increasing both union strength and government market intervention, the wartime 
atmosphere was only one of a number of factors that contributed to the drop in 
executive pay.32 A 2011 study by Carola Frydman and Raven Molloy 
determined that the drop in relative executive pay, defined as “the ratio of 
executive pay to average industry earnings,” is largely related to a drop in the 
return to firm size and a growing negative correlation between compensation 
and industry unionization.33  
The war overseas during that period was the center of attention, and firms 
on the home-front struggled because of it. Executive pay rose much less than 
that of the typical worker during the 1940s, and the return to firm size fell from 
1940 until 1942 and remained persistently low until 1949.34 Frydman and 
Molloy attribute this correlative drop to a change in corporate governance 
practices and shifting social norms.35 During the war, the idea of the “equality 
of sacrifice” rang throughout the media as people in America gave up their 
wealth for the success of their soldiers fighting in foreign lands.36 Then-
President Roosevelt’s fireside chats repeated ideals of sacrificing for the good 
of others most likely filtered into the business world, and these ideals may have 
altered public perceptions of fairness regarding executives’ egregious paychecks 
and the possibility of monopolizing firms taking advantage of the American 
public.37 
Wartime also meant that unions on the home-front had an opportunity to 
grow in power. With the war-time economy boosting many unionized industries, 
employers were less opposed to union activity.38 Additionally, the government 
took action during wartime to minimize labor disputes so that the country could 
focus on producing materiel for the fight overseas.39 Union membership grew 
drastically during the war and continued to stay high until the end of the 
decade.40 With greater support, unions were able to voice their opposition to 
 
 31. Carola Frydman & Raven Molloy, Pay Cuts for the Boss: Executive Compensation in the 
1940s 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 17303, 2011). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 4–5. 
 34. Id. at 24–25. 
 35. Id. 
 36. David M. Kennedy, The Nation: On the Home Front; What Is Patriotism Without 
Sacrifice?, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/weekinreview/the-
nation-on-the-home-front-what-is-patriotism-without-sacrifice.html [https://perma.cc/43BK-NN 
PT]. 
 37. Frydman & Molloy, supra note 31, at 25. 
 38. Id. at 18. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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excessive executive salaries more effectively, and executives had no choice but 
to listen or run the risk of losing their workforce.41 
After the drop in executive pay in the 1940s, executive compensation 
stagnated relative to the average worker’s salary from the 1950s and into the late 
1970s.42 This is most likely due to the fact that top Federal Income Tax rates 
during that period remained above seventy percent, temporarily deterring 
executives from taking higher salaries.43 From 1950 to 1975, average executive 
compensation grew by only 0.8% annually after adjusting for inflation.44 Due to 
the phenomenon now referred to as the “Great Compression,” the increase in 
post-WWII demand for less-educated workers combined with the consistently 
rising minimum wage to create a smaller wage gap among employees.45 With 
more employees to pay, and a higher minimum wage to pay those employees, 
executives had no choice but to distribute compensation out of a smaller pot than 
they had become accustomed to in the 1920s.46 As taxes rose for executives and 
other top earners during the 1950s, companies transitioned to paying their 
executives using tax-favored deferred compensation schemes.47 The Revenue 
Act of 1950 allowed companies to grant executives “restricted stock options” 
which, in effect, gave executives an ascension to wealth in the form of ownership 
of the company while not being subject to the risk of typical stocks.48 The 
“restricted stock options” of the Revenue Act of 1950 became “qualified stock 
options” in the Revenue Act of 1964.49 “Qualified stock options” gave 
executives the benefit of holding stock in their company while receiving much 
more favorable tax treatment than typical stocks.50 However, this transition to 
deferred compensation options did not have a substantial effect on overall 
executive compensation into the 1970s.51 
The squeeze on executive pay lasted almost thirty years, but tides turned in 
the latter half of the 1970s. From 1973 to 1979, median cash compensation for 
CEOs in the Forbes 800 rose more than 12.2% annually while the annual 
inflation rate was 8.5%.52 For the first time since before WWII, executive pay 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 93 n.261. 
 43. History of Federal Income Tax Rates: 1913 – 2017, BRADFORD TAX INSTITUTE, 
https://bradfordtaxinstitute.com/Free_Resources/Federal-Income-Tax-Rates.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/ZTJ3-UXJU] (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 44. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 65. 
 45. Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the 
United State at Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1, 32 (1992) 
 46. Id. 
 47. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 78. 
 48. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 218, 64 Stat. 906, 942 (1950). 
 49. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 221, 78 Stat. 19, 64–66 (1964). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 65–66. 
 52. Id. at 66. 
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had experienced a sustained growth relative to the inflation rate, and it was only 
getting started.53 According to an article in Newsweek from 1991, “CEO pay 
rose dramatically all through the 1980s—212 percent . . . —four times faster 
than pay for ordinary workers.”54 
Executive compensation continued to climb at an astronomical rate through 
the 1990s. The median compensation of an S&P 500 CEO was $2.2 million in 
1992.55 By 2001, that number had grown to $7.2 million, more than a 200% 
increase.56 The early twenty-first century was the pinnacle for American 
executive compensation, and executive compensation has been declining slowly 
ever since.57 However, CEO compensation is still extremely high in relation to 
the average employee’s salary, and the American public is asking: How did this 
happen? What does it mean? And how will it change? 
Outrage against excessive executive compensation became a major societal 
concern in the 1980s when a takeover boom arose fueled by the junk bond 
market, which facilitated the financing of large takeovers.58 As executives in the 
country’s biggest companies feared losing their positions of power due to hostile 
takeovers from shareholders, many large firms implemented so-called “golden 
parachutes” to provide ousted executives with cash payouts and other benefits 
to ease their transition into unemployment.59 While an abundance of takeovers 
in the 1980s cost mid-level workers their jobs and their livelihoods, executives 
received notice of their dismissal alongside lucrative severance payments.60 
Naturally, the vast majority of Americans who did not receive millions of dollars 
upon their termination were furious with the executives who did. It did not help 
that American executives in the early 1990s were making roughly three times 
their counterparts in Britain, four times their counterparts in Germany, and six 
times their counterparts in Japan.61 This discrepancy is likely related to the shift 
toward performance-oriented pay for American executives in the early 1990s.62  
The issue with the rise of performance-oriented pay is that the correlation 
between the performance of a company and the executives’ pay has never been 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. The Pay Police, NEWSWEEK (June 16, 1991, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/pay-
police-204464 [https://perma.cc/AV7Y-HYEB]. 
 55. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 67. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Mishel & Schieder, supra note 3. 
 58. Peer Fiss, A Short History of Golden Parachutes, HARV. BUS. REV., (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/10/a-short-history-of-golden-parachutes [https://perma.cc/6VUG-NVVA]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 67. 
 61. Peter Passell, Economic Watch; Those Big Executive Salaries May Mask a Bigger 
Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/20/business/economic-
watch-those-big-executive-salaries-may-mask-a-bigger-problem.html?pagewanted=all [https://per 
ma.cc/J5P2-QKSP]. 
 62. Bank, Cheffins & Wells, supra note 24, at 67–68. 
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clear.63 Graef Crystal, a professor from the University of California at Berkeley 
and an expert on executive pay, conducted a survey in the early 1990s that found 
that ninety-six percent of CEO pay “has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with 
the company’s performance.”64 Crystal compared the executive compensation 
at 450 corporations to the total return received by those corporations’ 
shareholders and found that only five percent of the statistical variation could be 
explained by the company’s performance that year.65 Crystal concluded that, 
“[t]he most common reference used by compensation committees must be a 
table of random numbers.”66 
Boards of directors typically determined executive pay leading up to the 
1990s, but a trend arose that decade where CEOs recruited directors who might 
have been more likely to reward greater executive compensation in return for 
their position as director.67 Crystal’s study uncovered an interesting observation 
in the 1990s: “the higher the directors’ fees, the higher the CEO’s pay.”68 This 
suggests that CEOs were buying directors’ loyalty with high directors’ fees and 
accepting the directors’ thanks in the form of higher compensation.69 
Another issue that arose from performance-oriented pay is the “ratchet 
effect” (also called the “Lake Wobegon” effect after the fictional lake in a 
Garrison Keillor novel where “all the children are above average”).70 As boards 
of directors meet to set their executives’ compensations, they typically bring in 
an outside consultant to determine an appropriate amount.71 Those consultants 
usually compare peer companies and provide the boards with what would equate 
to an average executive compensation.72 However, afraid to admit that their 
executives are simply “average,” the board of directors will set their executives’ 
compensation at a level that would equate to the sixtieth or seventieth percentile, 
“ratcheting up” the average executive compensation with each “above-average” 
determination.73 
The rapid growth of executive compensation came to a halt in the early 
2000s due to the “dot-com” bubble burst and corporate governance scandals 
such as what lead to the collapse of Enron.74 As the economy sank and the 
 
 63. See The Pay Police, supra note 54. 
 64. See id. See also Passell, supra note 61. 
 65. See Passell, supra note 61. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See The Pay Police, supra note 52. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. DANIEL JUROW ET AL., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: HOW DOES PAY INFLUENCE 
DECISIONS AND GOVERNANCE? 7, https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/leadership/sites/leadership/ 
files/bernstein-exec-comp-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WFQ-84EN]. 
 71. The Pay Police, supra note 52. 
 72. Id. 
 73. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 7. 
 74. Bank, Cheffins & Wells , supra note 24, at 68. 
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American people had tangible evidence of executives extorting their power, 
executives lost bargaining power and were forced to give up some of their 
questionably-earned pay.75 The financial crisis in 2008 led to another slight drop 
in executive pay, but executive pay in America still vastly eclipses the pay of 
the average employee.76 
The ratio of executive pay to average employee pay in America has practical 
implications beyond public perception and international comparison. Studies 
have shown that there is a significant relationship between pay equity among 
different levels of employees and the resulting product quality.77 It is the 
author’s opinion that product quality can be a crucial determinant of customer 
satisfaction and business profitability. The perception of unfairness created by 
vast pay inequity, as is becoming prominent in America today, can lead to a 
decreasing sense of worth from lower-level employees and, ultimately, lost 
profits.78  
III.  THREE REGULATORY APPROACHES TO CURBING EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 
Instead of sitting back while executives continually drive their 
compensation higher than the levels enjoyed by their employees, American 
regulators have attempted to curb excessive executive compensation in three 
different fashions: tax implementation, shareholder-powered “say on pay” 
proposals, and compelled disclosure.79 
A. Taxation of Executive Compensation 
In August of 1993, on the recommendation of then-President Bill Clinton, 
Congress enacted legislation—the Revenue Recollection Act of 1993 and 
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code—that removed the ability of 
corporations to deduct executive compensation in excess of one million dollars 
that was not performance-based.80 In addition, the Revenue Recollection Act 
imposed a special surtax on incomes exceeding $250,000.00 per year.81 The 
Congressional theory was that exorbitant executive salaries would be too costly 
from a tax standpoint to negotiate and to provide.82 Writing shortly after the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Douglas M. Cowherd & David I. Levine, Product Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-
Level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory, 37 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 302, 314, 316 (1992). 
 78. Id. at 307. 
 79. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 8–9. 
 80. Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation – A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. 
REV. 937, 940 (1993). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 957. 
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release of the Revenue Recollection Act, Charles M. Elson of Stetson University 
said that, “[t]his response is akin to removing a splinter by amputating the limb. 
The splinter is gone, but at an enormous cost.”83 He theorized then that the 
attempt to place a cap on executive compensation would limit the productivity 
of executives who were incentivized by higher salaries.84 When he opined that 
the “tax-based ‘cure’ may result in more harm to the patient than the initial 
problem,” he was correct that it would result in more harm, but the cause of the 
harm was not what he expected.85 
The initial response to the $1,000,000 cap was to inspire companies whose 
CEOs earned less than that amount to increase their executive salaries.86 Instead 
of becoming a mark that companies should avoid, the million dollar mark 
became a “standard” for executive salary and a bargaining point for those CEOs 
who thought they were not being compensated enough.87 In the first year after 
the tax was imposed, executive pay increased at a rate twenty-nine percent faster 
than it had in the fourteen years before the tax came into effect.88 Section 162(m) 
made it much more difficult for shareholders to challenge the reasonableness of 
any executive salary under one million dollars, and, while one million dollars 
might be pocket change for some executives in large corporations, it could be 
entirely unreasonable for executives with smaller roles in smaller 
organizations.89 
In light of the shareholders’ inability to challenge salaries under one million 
dollars, it must be mentioned that courts have a history of being particularly 
hesitant to interfere in executive compensation practices when shareholders 
attempt to challenge compensation through derivative actions.90 Because 
executive compensation decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, 
the court applies an assumption that the board of directors made the correct 
decision in allocating assets so long as there is no self-dealing and so long as 
there is not a waste of corporate assets.91 The doctrine of waste, established by 
the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Hill, indicates that companies cannot “justify 
payments of sums as salaries so large as in substance and effect to amount to 
spoliation or waste of corporate property.”92 However, applying the doctrine of 
 
 83. Id. at 958. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Elson, supra note 80, at 958. 
 86. Joy S. Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through 
the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 522–23 (2009). 
 87. JUROW ET AL., supra note 70, at 8. 
 88. Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 89 (1998). 
 89. Id. at 96–97. 
 90. Elson, supra note 80, at 959–60. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933). 
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waste has been notoriously difficult to accomplish as explained by the Heller v. 
Boylan case from the New York State Supreme Court: 
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what yardstick is 
to be employed? Who or what is to supply the measuringrod? The conscience of 
equity? Equity is but another name for human being temporarily judicially 
robed. He is not omnipotent or omniscient. Can equity be so arrogant as to hold 
that it knows more about managing this corporation than its stockholders?93 
In the infamous Walt Disney case where Michael Ovitz received $140 million 
dollars in a severance package after only fourteen months of employment, the 
court reiterated the difficult burden of proving waste by saying “waste is a rare, 
unconscionable case[] where directors irrationally squander or give away 
corporate assets.”94 
In addition to mystifying the amount of executive compensation that would 
qualify as reasonable, Section 162(m) also allowed for unlimited deductions on 
executive compensation over one million dollars attributed to performance-
based pay.95 Treasury regulations provide an exceedingly low bar for 
performance based pay: “[a] performance goal need not, however, be based upon 
an increase or positive result under a business criterion and could include, for 
example, maintaining the status quo or limiting economic losses.”96 
Section 162(m) was not the only failed attempt at curbing executive 
compensation through taxation. Sections 280G and 4999, signed before Section 
162(m), similarly missed their mark.97 Section 280G, intended to decrease 
implementation of golden parachutes, disallowed tax deductions for golden 
parachute payments exceeding the amount 2.99 times greater than annual 
compensation.98 However, like the cap on executive compensation, this led to 
the standardized golden parachute payment being at least 2.99 times annual 
compensation.99 Section 4999 imposed a tax equal to twenty percent the amount 
of any payment in excess of the golden parachute limit set in Section 280G.100 
Companies responded with “gross ups,” or increases in payment, to cover the 
twenty percent tax imposed on their golden parachute agreements.101 This 
resulted in corporate monies being used to both inflate executive compensation 
and to pay off the taxes resulting from the inflated compensation. 
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B. Shareholder “Say-on-Pay” Proposals 
Shareholders had voiced their opinions about executive compensation for 
many years before they were given the authority to weigh in and the means to 
do so.102 The origin of the “say-on-pay” proposal, as it is now known, is an 
expansion to SEC Rule 14a-8 in 1992 to include executive compensation among 
the issues shareholder proxy proposals were able to address.103 Previously 
disallowed under the “ordinary business” exclusion preventing shareholders 
from submitting proposals having to do with the ordinary business of a 
company’s management,104 political unrest with the issue of executive 
compensation in the early 1990s inspired the SEC to place a renewed emphasis 
on that issue.105 
Starting in 1992, shareholders had the power to offer their opinion on the 
paychecks executives were cashing. However, “say-on-pay” votes in the United 
States are merely advisory: even if the shareholders responded to a proposal with 
a resounding “yes” or “no” vote, the company has the ability to completely 
ignore the proposal.106 Additionally, “say-on-pay” proposals were not initially 
required until the United States mandated their inclusion under the Dodd-Frank 
Act.107 The current iteration of Rule 14A requires that companies submit a “say-
on-pay” proposal to their shareholders in the annual proxy at least once every 
three years.108 Even so, the “say-on-pay” proposal is merely an advisory vote, 
as the vote “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an 
issuer.”109 
So far, the advisory “say-on-pay” proposals have produced mixed results in 
the United States. A 2017 study in the Multinational Finance Journal cited 
studies that have found that “shareholders generally support managers’ pay 
packages unless the firm performs poorly and has excessive executive pay, low 
shareholder returns, and negative proxy voting recommendations.”110 Another 
study cited found that “fewer than 3% of firms fail to pass their say-on-pay 
proposals, but shareholder dissent is higher in firms with high CEO 
 
 102. Stephani A. Mason, Ann F. Medinets & Dan Palmon, Say-on-Pay: Is Anybody Listening?, 
20 MULTINAT’L FIN. J. 273, 285 (2016). 
 103. Id. at 285–86. 
 104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1963). 
 105. Mason, Medinets & Palmon, supra note 102, at 285. 
 106. Id. at 286. 
 107. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and 
Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act, (Jan. 25, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm [https://perma.cc/EA84-TRTT]. 
 108. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 
76 Fed. Reg. 6010–11 (Jan. 25, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240). 
 109. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c) (2012). 
 110. Mason, Medinets & Palmon, supra note 102, at 292. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] REMOVING A SPLINTER BY AMPUTATING THE LIMB 173 
compensation or poor performance.”111 In other words, advisory “say-on-pay” 
proposals are extremely unlikely to pass, even when shareholders are upset with 
executive compensation or the company’s performance. 
The argument for the ineffectiveness of advisory “say-on-pay” votes is two-
fold: shareholders do not want to put in the effort necessary to make a 
meaningful vote, and shareholders have a more powerful ability than advisory 
voting.112 For those shareholders with minimal holdings in the company, “the 
opportunity cost to become informed is high” due to the elaborate nature of 
compensation plans.113 Shareholders with more expansive, non-controlling 
holdings are unlikely to vote against executive compensation because there is a 
high chance their own executive compensation is arguably excessive as well.114 
The shareholders’ greater power, however, is the power to sell their shares.115 If 
shareholders are not happy with a company’s executive compensation plans, 
they can sell their shares and move on to a different investment. Those with 
short-term investments have little to no incentive to vote, and those with long-
term investments are shown to be very likely to vote in favor of the company’s 
compensation plan.116 
C. Disclosure of Executive Compensation 
The “say-on-pay” initiative was not the only effort the SEC took in the early 
1990s to curb executive compensation. Coinciding with the expansion of 
shareholder proposals to include executive compensation, the SEC increased 
requirements for the disclosure of executive compensation.117 As already 
mentioned, compensation disclosure became mandatory in the 1930s.118 The 
goal then was to “shame” executives into taking smaller compensation packages 
following the Great Depression.119 In 1938, the disclosure requirement 
expanded to include full descriptions of compensation plans, and in 1942 those 
compensation arrangements were required to be presented in tables for each 
director or officer making more than $20,000 a year.120 Ten years later, the SEC 
mandated disclosure for each director and for the “top 3” executives, as well as 
demanding that deferred compensation, in the forms of pension or retirement 
plans, had to be disclosed separately.121 
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In 1978, the SEC again increased disclosure requirements by mandating that 
companies make their compensation disclosures closer to the beginning of 
disclosure documents, attempting to prevent those disclosures from being buried 
within the documentation.122 As addressed previously, the heightened scrutiny 
on disclosures in the early 1990s coincided with an incredible boom in executive 
compensation.123 Reflecting on the reform of the 1990s, Graef Crystal, who had 
been an advisor to the SEC for the purposes of developing the reform, said, “I 
absolutely thought it would cause comp[ensation] to go down because the 
disclosures would be so embarrassing. But it turned out that when somebody is 
hauling in $200 million, he’s not embarrassable.”124 
While the goal of increased disclosure was to shame executives into taking 
lower salaries, more than seventy years of disclosure has only led to increased 
salaries. A 2006 New York Times article summarizes the various attempts to curb 
executive compensation and how they have failed.125 The article points out that 
increased disclosure has only lead to an increased awareness of what other 
executives are making and how they are making it.126 The author states: “history 
suggests that whenever [an executive] discover[s] a fellow C.E.O. is getting 
something they don’t have, they make a grab for it.”127 
In the same article, then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said that “[i]t is 
not the role of the S.E.C. to determine the level of compensation. It is the role of 
directors and shareholders.”128 This would seem to be backwards as the SEC 
continues to enact stricter regulations on compensation disclosure, while 
directors only have incentives to increase compensation and shareholder “say-
on-pay” proposals lack the necessary power or participation to have a legitimate 
effect.  
The current state of executive compensation has scholars perplexed. At the 
end of the 2006 article, author Joseph Nocera left this note: 
So how would you fix the executive pay problem? Send me your ideas at 
tsnocera@nytimes.com. If I get enough good ones, I’ll revisit the subject. And 
if not, I’ll just keep wringing my hands, like everyone else. 
Nocera left the Times in 2015.129 He never released a solution to the issue of 
executive compensation. 
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IV.  THE SEC PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE: MORE TROUBLE THAN 
IT’S WORTH 
The latest regulatory attempt at curbing executive compensation is Section 
953(b) of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
which is more casually referred to as the “pay ratio directive” or the “SEC Pay 
Ratio Disclosure Rule” (the “Rule”).130 Originally proposed in 2010, the final 
Rule passed in August of 2015.131 Author of the Rule, U.S. Senator Bob 
Menendez of New Jersey, celebrated the passage of the rule in saying that the 
Rule would “[restore] sanity to runaway executive pay.”132 Menendez insisted 
that “[t]his simple benchmark will help investors monitor both how a company 
treats [its] average workers and whether its executive pay is reasonable.”133 
The Rule was set to take effect in 2017, with initial disclosures coming in 
proxy statements during 2018.134 This buffer period turned out to be 
advantageous as the Rule produced continuous debate lasting up until those 
affected were forced to turn their attention to implementing the rule.135 
Initial supporters of the Rule, like N.Y. State Comptroller Thomas P. 
DiNapoli, opined that a great disparity between CEO pay and employee pay 
would lead to a drop in morale and productivity.136 Laura Campos, the Director 
of Shareholder Activities for the Nathan Cummings Foundation, wrote a letter 
to the Secretary of the SEC, Elizabeth Murphy, illustrating that shareholders 
have a right to know information concerning executive pay because those 
exorbitant wages could be used to improve the company and the corresponding 
stock.137 Even Hillary Clinton spoke out in support of the Rule, saying that 
“workers have a right to know whether executive pay at their company has 
gotten out of balance, and so does the public.”138 
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The Rule’s initial passage came as a result of a 3-2 vote from the SEC.139 
The two dissenting Commissioners, Daniel Gallagher and Michael Piwowar, 
responded to the passage with seething dissents.140 In response to the SEC’s 
reasoning that the Rule would “help inform investors in their oversight of 
executive compensation, including say-on-pay votes,” Gallagher, stealing a line 
from Justice Scalia, said, “this is pure applesauce.”141 Gallagher argued that the 
Rule was far too broad, particularly the definition of “employee”, and that 
implementation would cost an “astronomical” amount of money.142 He found 
“no credible evidence in the record that a reasonable investor would find the pay 
ratio to be useful,” and called the pay ratio information that would be disclosed 
“low-quality, non-comparable data of use only to certain investors who have 
idiosyncratic reasons for wanting it.”143 From Gallagher’s point of view, the 
intent of the Rule was to “name and shame registrants into reducing CEO 
pay.”144 He closed out his comments by saying that the Rule “highlights the sad 
fact that, over five years after Dodd-Frank, the Commission is still wandering 
through the wilderness, and that the voice of one or two minority Commissioners 
crying out in that wilderness can do little to put us back on the right path.”145 
Piwowar had different concerns, stating that the Rule “pandered to 
politically-connected special interest groups and, independent of the [Dodd-
Frank] Act, could not stand on its own merits.”146 He stated that the Dodd-Frank 
Act allows for investor testing of possible regulations, but the SEC did not take 
advantage of this testing in development of the Rule.147 He also pointed out that 
the passage of the Rule was rushed, and the timing of the vote was intentional 
due to rising opposition in Congress and the convenient recesses in the House of 
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opposition.148 In Piwowar’s words, the SEC’s actions qualified as “bullying 
tactics,” and according to Piwowar, “[a]cquiescing to bullies only gives them 
more ammunition and makes it worse.”149 
Continued opposition threatened the enactment of the Rule. As recently as 
February of 2017, then-Acting Chairman of the SEC Piwowar opened the Rule 
up to comment.150 Not until September of 2017, three months before the Rule 
were to go into effect, did the SEC confirm that the Rule would be 
implemented.151 At that point, some public companies required to disclose a 
ratio had yet to begin preparing for its calculation, leaving them with an 
extremely short amount of time to achieve compliance.152 
The major points of opposition are that the Rule is excessively costly and 
provides no real benefit to investors.153 The excessive costs come from the time 
and manpower needed to calculate the required ratio.154 The Center for Capital 
Markets conducted a study comprised of 118 public companies that would be 
required to disclose their pay ratio and found that the average company expected 
to spend 952 hours per year calculating their ratio at an average labor cost of 
$185,600.155 Applied to the entire population of public companies that are 
affected by the Rule, this equates to $710.9 million and 3.6 million hours applied 
to compliance with the Rule annually.156 
The difficulty in complying with the Rule is a product of the language of the 
Rule itself.157 The statute provides that an “employee” means “an individual 
employed by the registrant or any of its consolidated subsidiaries, whether as a 
full-time, part-time, seasonal, or temporary worker, as of a date chosen by the 
registrant within the last three months of the registrant’s last completed fiscal 
year.”158 The proposed rule stated that public companies should determine their 
median employee from an employee base established on the last day of their 
fiscal year, but outside comments from public companies whose employee bases 
are heavily affected by seasonal hiring requested a more lenient standard.159 
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While this may be helpful for public companies with seasonal employee 
populations that do not accurately represent the average employee population, it 
provides additional compliance costs for public companies who either (1) have 
tax and payroll systems that are not calculated until the last day of the fiscal year, 
or (2) go through the added work of calculating ratios determined by employee 
populations on numerous dates for the most favorable numbers.160 
In additional guidance for applying the Rule, the SEC excluded from the 
definition of employee “workers who are employed, and whose compensation is 
determined, by an unaffiliated third party but who provide services to the 
registrant or its consolidated subsidiaries as independent contractors or ‘leased’ 
workers.”161 However, many public companies hire employees under the 
“independent contractor” title and determine those employees’ compensation, 
which produces even more effort required for companies who employ both 
independent contractors whose compensation is determined by a third party, 
such as a contracting firm, and independent contractors on contracts with 
compensation determined by the company itself.162 The law requires that the 
public company affected by the Rule “may identify the median employee using 
annual total compensation or any other compensation measure that is 
consistently applied to all employees included in the calculation.”163 
Additionally, public companies are allowed to exclude certain employees from 
this calculation.164 Up to five percent of non-U.S. employees are excludable, but 
the public company must exclude all the employees from any non-U.S. country 
if they choose to exclude any employee from that country.165 Also, employees 
from countries where data privacy laws may conflict with the disclosure are also 
excludable.166 Both of these exclusions may help public companies with large, 
multi-national employee populations, but executing the exclusions still requires 
an impressive amount of work to determine if the exclusions will save time or 
produce a more favorable ratio.167 
By way of offering guidance for how to determine the components of 
“annual total compensation” necessitated by the Rule, the regulation provides 
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this definition: “Annual total compensation means total compensation for the 
registrant’s last completed fiscal year.”168 The SEC allows the use of “reasonable 
estimates” in calculating annual total compensation,169 but it offers no guidance 
regarding how benefits, allowances, insurance costs, et cetera should be included 
in the calculation.170 
The flexibility allowed in determining the ratio required by the Rule “will 
likely render pay ratio comparability across companies—even those within the 
same industry—virtually unachievable.”171 Because each public company can 
determine compensation in its own manner and choose to exclude certain 
employees at their discretion, there is extensive potential for public companies 
to game the disclosure in deceptive ways.172 Each public company’s disclosure 
will be unique, but it is inevitable that activists will use the ratios to “name and 
shame” certain public companies with high pay ratios,173 even if the differing 
pay ratios produce “no particular insight whether a CEO or the median employee 
is fairly compensated.”174 
As of January 2018, one pay ratio has been released from a reporting 
company.175 Invivo Therapeutics Holdings Corp., a public company of sixteen 
employees, submitted this verbose disclosure in their proxy statement: 
PAY RATIO 
Following is a reasonable estimate, prepared under applicable SEC rules, of the 
ratio of the annual total compensation of our Chief Executive Officer to the 
median of the annual total compensation of our other employees. We determined 
our median employee based on base salary (annualized in the case of full- and 
part-time employees who joined the Company during 2017) of each of our 16 
employees (excluding the Chief Executive Officer) as of December 1, 2017. Of 
the two potential median employees, we selected the employee without 
significant severance payments. The annual total compensation of our median 
employee (other than the Chief Executive Officer) for 2017 was $384,528. As 
disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table appearing on page 76, our 
former Chief Executive Officer’s annual total compensation for 2017 was 
$2,471,333. Our former Chief Executive Officer served in this capacity from 
 
 168. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(2)(ii). 
 169. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402. 
 170. BRANNON, supra note 12, at 5–6. 
 171. Allan B. Afterman, Pay Ratio Disclosure: A Final SEC Rule Laden with Controversy, 
CPA JOURNAL (Apr. 2016), https://www.cpajournal.com/2016/04/14/pay-ratio-disclosure-final-
sec-rule-laden-controversy/ [https://perma.cc/LH3G-6KJD]. 
 172. Bank & Georgiev, supra note 154, at 22. 
 173. Afterman, supra note 171. 
 174. BRANNON, supra note 12, at 4. 
 175. Cydney S. Posner, First Pay-Ratio Disclosure Sighted, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b2dbb1d7-c68e-4a29-a1c7-58e5d84148e9 
[https://perma.cc/M6K6-86C5]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
180 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:161 
January 1, 2017 to December 18, 2017, which includes December 1, 2017, the 
date of determination for the median employee. As noted in the footnotes of the 
Summary Compensation Table, Mr. Perrin’s salary in the Summary 
Compensation Table includes a payment of 10 days salary in conjunction with 
his resignation in lieu of the notice period in his Employment Agreement, so his 
annual total compensation includes salary for a full year. Based on the foregoing, 
our estimate of the ratio of the annual total compensation of our CEO to the 
median of the annual total compensation of all other employees was 6.4 to 1. 
Given the different methodologies that various public companies will use to 
determine an estimate of their pay ratio, the estimated ratio reported above 
should not be used as a basis for comparison between companies.176 
Note that Invivo took the initiative to explicitly plead that the ratio disclosed 
should not be used to compare public companies. Also, note the variety of 
elements that went into determining the ratio in a public company with less than 
twenty employees. Imagine the time and effort it would take to apply this Rule 
in a public company of twenty thousand employees. Due to the flexibility of the 
Rule and the arbitrary nature of the results, early findings show that the Rule 
will cost a lot more than it is worth. 
V.  TAKING A TIP FROM GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
After the global economic downtown at the end of the twenty-first century’s 
first decade, global leaders met in Pittsburgh for the G20 Summit.177 Political 
leaders from around the world agreed that extensive executive compensation 
reform was needed to prevent future economic crises.178 In the U.S., the first 
attempt at comprehensive economic reform came in the form of the 
aforementioned Dodd-Frank Act.179 On the date of the Act’s passage, the New 
York Times wrote that “a number of the details have been left for regulators to 
work out, inevitably setting off complicated tangles down the road that could 
last for years.”180 The Times was correct in its prediction that implementing the 
Act would be arduous. As of the five-year anniversary of the Act’s passage, 
almost thirty percent of the rulemaking deadlines set in the Act had passed 
without finalization of any rule.181 A packet of all of the rules passed or proposed 
by that anniversary would contain more pages than thirty-four copies of Herman 
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Melville’s Moby Dick.182 While U.S. regulators labored to implement economic 
reform post-recession, the powers-that-were in Germany made quick work in 
passing legislation that took almost as long to take effect as it does to pronounce. 
In June of 2009, before the G20 Summit when global leaders were to discuss 
executive compensation reform, Germany passed the 
Vorstandsvergiltungsangemessenheitsgesetz, or “VorstAG” for short.183 While 
the Dodd-Frank Act has taken years to be put into action, the VorstAG was 
entirely entered into force by the end of that summer.184 The VorstAG was 
designed to reformat German executive compensation by increasing 
transparency and giving shareholders more insight into companies’ 
compensation policies, both goals the Dodd-Frank Act intended to achieve.185 It 
is important to note that, while executive compensation had been a contentious 
topic for decades in the U.S. by the time the 2009 G20 Summit came around, 
excessive executive compensation had been a non-issue in Germany until the 
turn of the century.186 In 1997, the top German executives at Daimler-Chrysler, 
BMW, VEBA, and Siemens in Germany made from $1.5 to $2.5 million, while 
the top American executives at Daimler-Chrysler, GE, Intel, and Healthsouth 
made between $14 and $131 million (using a rough conversion from the now-
defunct deutschmark).187 
There are two reasons German executive compensation was so low for so 
long. First, the body that governs German public companies, the Aktiengesetz, 
did not allow companies to offer stock options as compensation until 1998.188 
Second, the driving historical forces for German and American corporate 
governance were very different. While the U.S. focused on “stock market” or 
“Anglo-American capitalism” that inspired companies to run primarily for the 
benefit of shareholders, German companies historically practiced “welfare 
capitalism,” which places an emphasis on the concerns of the stakeholders, 
including employees and creditors.189 In a welfare capitalism system, a 
company’s executive compensation is tied to the interests of the employees and 
creditors of the company, and those interests lead to greater influence in setting 
compensation.190 Whereas American companies were more concerned with 
growth, German companies, under the welfare capitalism system, were 
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concerned with the economic stability that comes with satisfied employees and 
creditors.191 
At the turn of the century, Anglo-American capitalism found its way across 
the pond and into German territory on the heels of the Daimler-Chrysler 
merger.192 When the two companies came together, the vice chairman of the U.S. 
company made more than the top ten German employees combined.193 With 
stock options available as an element of executive compensation post-1998, 
German executives began to follow the lead of their American counterparts and 
focus on the shareholders instead of the stakeholders.194 German compensation 
rose over the opening decade of the twenty-first century, but it came nowhere 
close to where American compensation stands.195 AFL-CIO information 
compiled in 2012 found that German CEOs were paid salaries 147 times as large 
as their average workers, but top-ranking American executives at S&P 500 
companies made 354 times as much as their average workers during that year.196 
The differences in how the U.S. and Germany treat executive compensation 
are amplified by the corporate governance systems in place in both countries. 
Due to German skepticism toward directors’ ability to protect a company’s 
interests while making decisions affecting other stakeholders, German stock 
companies are required to have a two-tiered board. 197 Such companies must 
have a management board to run the company and a supervisory board to ensure 
that the management board is doing their job.198 Any member of the 
management board cannot also serve on the supervisory board, establishing a 
check on the powers of the management board and ensuring that the 
management board is acting in the best interests of the company.199 
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Additionally, the supervisory board determines the compensation of the 
members of the management board.200 
In contrast, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations requires that the majority 
of directors at listed issuing companies be disinterested, but interested directors 
can serve on compensation committees or perform the function of determining 
compensation (so long as they do not vote on their own salaries, which would 
be challengeable by shareholders absent shareholder ratification).201 Some 
corporations might attempt to mimic the formation of a supervisory board in the 
formation of compensation committees, but they are not required.202 There are 
some requirements for the independence of compensation committee members 
among NYSE and NASDAQ-listed companies,203 but the independence of these 
committee members does not produce the same company-centric concern that 
the German supervisory board does. 
Part of the reason German supervisory boards are so concerned with the 
well-being of the company is the presence of employee representation on 
supervisory boards, a concept known as co-determination.204 Under German 
law, companies with more than 2,000 employees must allow employees working 
in Germany to elect fifty percent of the supervisory board.205 If there are 
supplementary committees to take on tasks such as determining executive 
compensation, they must follow the same ratio.206 Those elected by the 
employee population will be much more likely to avoid approving excessive 
executive compensation for two reasons. First and foremost, those from the 
average employee population will be blown away by the numbers presented in 
multimillion dollar compensation packages.207 A 2016 study from the Stanford 
Graduate School of Business found that the typical American believes a CEO at 
a Fortune 500 company earns $1.0 million in compensation.208 The median 
reported compensation for Fortune 500 CEOs in 2016 was $10.3 million, ten 
times the estimate of the typical citizen.209 The other reason employee 
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representatives tend to shy away from gratuitous executive compensation is 
selfish, but rightfully so. Employee representatives are much more concerned 
with direct executive-to-employee compensation comparisons than independent 
committee members would be, as they might be on the wrong end of the equation 
if they think their CEO is making money that should be going home with the 
average worker instead.210 
The other aspect of German corporate governance that affects treatment of 
executive compensation is the fact that the sections of the German Corporate 
Governance Code (“GCGC”) are not technically binding, but merely 
recommendations.211 The GCGC operates on a “comply- or-explain” basis 
where publicly-traded companies are only required to disclose to what extent 
they have complied with GCGC recommendations and why they chose not to 
comply with any recommendations.212 If the GCGC issues recommendations 
that do not produce satisfactory compliance, the German government has shown 
a willingness to turn those recommendations into binding law, just as it did with 
disclosure of individual compensation in the early 2000s.213 The fact that the 
GCGC is not technically binding allows companies to interpret corporate 
governance recommendations in ways that suit the companies themselves, 
instead of relying on the legislature to enact binding laws which apply across the 
board for all types of businesses.214 Instead of forcing companies to comply with 
inflexible regulations, the GCGC allows companies to find what is best suited 
for themselves and their stakeholders.215 Additionally, this flexible corporate 
governance environment allows the market to be the ultimate arbitrator when it 
comes to approval of corporate actions.216 Instead of relying on the government 
to enact stricter regulations that force suitable corporate compliance, German 
companies are inspired to act responsibly on their own merit or run the risk of 
their shareholders leaving for greener pastures in the form of companies with 
more appropriate corporate governance strategies.217 
While the Dodd-Frank Act has been slow to implement and, arguably, 
ineffective, the German VorstAG represents the opposite end of the spectrum in 
terms of efficacy and efficiency. The VorstAG set out to (1) increase 
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transparency, (2) increase sustainability among compensation structures, and (3) 
emphasize long-term company success and stability instead of immediate profits 
in structuring compensation.218 A study of the first three years of the VorstAG’s 
implementation found that transparency increased dramatically with longer, 
clearer, and more in-depth compensation discussions being released to 
shareholders.219 Early returns on sustainability and a shift in focus toward 
extended success are inconclusive over such a short time period as they are both 
long-term goals by nature.220 However, the biggest mark of success is not a 
quantitative figure. It is the fact that the public concern for executive 
compensation in Germany has subsided.221 The German government has moved 
past executive compensation to other corporate governance issues, and German 
newspapers rarely discuss executive compensation anymore, something that 
cannot be said of their American counterparts.222 
Even without the immediate statistics to back up the success of the VorstAG, 
the decrease in public concern suggests that the German government’s quick and 
effective approach to tackling the issue of executive compensation through 
increased transparency and a shift toward sustainability at the interest of the 
companies themselves, and not the government that regulates them, achieved 
what it set out to accomplish. While the U.S. struggles to implement corporate 
governance guidelines a decade after the G20 Summit where executive 
compensation was a main focus, the German government proposed and 
implemented a successful plan in a few months’ time by giving German 
companies guideposts to success instead of highly-regulated avenues to 
compliance. What happened in Germany is evidence that more government 
regulation might not be the ideal pathway to addressing corporate governance 
issues. If the American government were to take a few pointers from their old 
rivals across the Atlantic and implement something similar to the VorstAG, they 
might be able to see if a system based on long-term success and sustainability, 
instead of increased compliance, would lead to empowered companies and 
shareholders being able to address their executives’ compensation on their own 
terms. After years of failures as a result of stricter regulations, maybe the U.S. 
could benefit from letting companies have a looser leash for once. 
One of the goals of the SEC Pay Ratio disclosure is to tighten the wage gap 
between the employees and employers, but it will most likely result only in 
employee dissatisfaction, which will lead to lower worker morale and poor 
performance.223 This paper has illustrated that external influences such as 
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increased disclosure, shareholder proposals, and stricter tax regulations have 
done little to help dispel the outrage surrounding executive compensation. In 
fact, increased disclosure and stricter tax regulations have provided benchmarks 
for executive compensation and produced great increases in executive pay. 
Former-SEC Chairman Cox said that it is not the SEC’s job to decrease 
executive compensation, and he is correct.224 Considering how the increased 
disclosure that goes along with the SEC Pay Ratio might cause more harm than 
good, this begs the question: What is the point of placing stricter regulations on 
companies if we already know they will not help? 
The SEC Pay Ratio is supposed to guide shareholders in “say-on-pay” 
proposals, but, even in the brief history of “say-on-pay”, it is evident that (1) the 
advisory votes have little effect on executive compensation, and (2) shareholders 
have little incentive to vote against executive compensation when they are better 
suited selling their shares and walking away. 
Shareholders have the ability to sell their stock at will, so they are naturally 
less inclined to be involved in the governance of a corporation. The same can be 
said of shareholders in Germany as it can in the U.S. However, German 
executive compensation culture differentiates itself because employees are 
much more tied to the organization than are the shareholders. 
While shareholders are primarily concerned with stock price and the 
changes in executive compensation that coincide with the market’s view of the 
organization, employees are naturally inclined to be much more interested in the 
allocation of the organization’s funds and the long-term health of the 
organization as a product of their position. Shareholders have the option of 
selling stock and pursuing greener pastures if corporate governance is not 
suitable. If employees are unhappy about corporate governance in their current 
organization, they are in a more difficult situation than unhappy shareholders. 
Leaving one organization for a position in another is arguably more burdensome 
than selling stock, particularly without a guarantee that the new position will be 
in an organization any more favorable than the last. 
It is suggested that the issue of executive compensation starts and ends with 
those who determine it: the board of directors. However, as previously 
illustrated, there is little to no incentive for those whose compensation is 
determined by the company’s highest executives to decrease the pay of those 
executives.225 
The lowest executive-to-average worker compensation rates in U.S. history 
came during the 1940s, but the likely causes—increased union power and heavy 
influence from social norms—cannot be replicated by external forces.226 If the 
U.S. is interested in solving its issue with executive compensation, I suggest that 
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the U.S. take a hint from their German counterparts and recommend employee 
representation on compensation committees. 
This would provide for greater influence from a body of stakeholders that 
has inherent interest in the long-term wellbeing of the company and the 
transparency of company-wide compensation. It has been shown that increased 
transparency in compensation policies leads to increased firm performance.227 A 
quick way to increase transparency would be to have an employee representative 
sitting at the table where compensation is determined, so that representative can 
report the reasoning behind this determination to the employees they represent. 
If employees are unhappy or compensation policies are not disclosed in a 
transparent fashion, the employee representative acts as a direct link between an 
employee population and those determining the compensation. Additionally, 
this representative can act as both a simulation of the union pressure union 
leaders held over executives in unionized industries in the 1940s and as a liaison 
for the social factors that helped compress executive compensation in the past 
but are now most likely ignored by directors whose primary concern is their own 
paycheck. 
Admittedly, one employee representative may not initially carry much 
weight in compensation determinations. However, the point is not to give 
employee representatives power that challenges that of shareholder 
representatives as the supervisory boards in Germany do.228 The point is to give 
employees a seat at the bargaining table. Even if the shareholder representatives 
initially ignore the employee representative, the fact that the employee 
representative is present creates a direct line to the employee population. If the 
shareholder representatives give no merit to the concerns of the employee 
population, work production will suffer, and employees will feel inspired to pack 
up their bags and look for a company where the shareholders care about 
employee input. 
In the end, an employee representative on the compensation committee has 
the potential to increase transparency between executives and employees, which 
has the potential to increase performance, increase stock price, and satisfy 
shareholders. In order to satisfy disgruntled employees and increase company 
performance, executives will have more incentive to take annual salary cuts in 
favor of deferred compensation plans that relate to the company’s success. 
Because deferred compensation plans receive favorable tax treatment, 
executives might be able to take home the same amount of money after-tax while 
not facing the pressure from employees due to the disgustingly large numbers 
popping out of the proxy disclosures. 
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Taking inspiration from the German VorstAG, the U.S. implementation of 
employee representation on compensation committees should be a 
recommendation, and not a binding requirement. The GCGC’s non-binding 
nature allows companies to decide what is best for them and for their 
shareholders.229 The institution of two-tiered boards in Germany in combination 
with mandatory employee representation gives companies greater power to 
supervise their directors and decreases the need for costly external regulation. 
American corporations are currently governed in such a way that the supervision 
of directors is limited to regulation from the SEC or shareholder activism, which 
is most often and most effectively exercised in the buying and selling of shares. 
The open-ended recommendations from the GCGC and heightened involvement 
from internal representatives through co-determination allow for a more 
individualized form of governance that might produce lasting effects on 
corporations that changing stock prices would not. 
An article from the Brooklyn Journal of International Law compares the 
GCGC’s approach at providing guideposts to corporate governance to the SEC’s 
method of strictly limiting every avenue possible in saying that the SEC 
“precisely defining every word removes space for innovation and the 
opportunity to let companies (and ultimately the market) decide what works 
well.”230 The author continues in saying that the “open-ended reform” offered in 
Germany  
is critical for triggering the self-reflection needed to determine how to best 
translate these general principles into practical measures. This kind of self-
reflection, in turn, is in and of itself vital. For if, as companies say, the one-size-
fits-all solution is too constraining, then they are in the best situation to 
determine which solutions work best for them.231 
My suggestion is for the U.S. to explore the effects of employee 
representation on compensation committees through corporate governance 
recommendations. I think it would be beneficial for the American government 
to take a detour from the typical highly-regulated SEC requirements and urge 
public companies to handle the issues with executive compensation on their own 
terms. The presence of an employee representative among compensation 
committee  members  may  not  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  level  of  executive  
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compensation, but giving employees a seat at the bargaining table will lessen the 
disconnect between executives and employees the SEC set out to solve with the 
Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and open up discussion for more internal solutions 
for compensation issues. 
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